Tag Archives: jewish identity

Bernie Sanders on Jewing

Presidential candidate Bernie Sanders wrote an op-ed for Jewish Currents on what jewing means to him.

Speaking for jews, to jews, Sanders jewsplains why jews are anti-White, how unlike Whites jews have a “right of self-determination”, how they serve their own interests by preaching “solidarity” and “equality” while demonizing and attacking Whites, and how this is all also a “conspiracy theory”. He then points out how jews have been doing this for centuries, screeching about “oppression” and “persecution” long before any other non-White/anti-White parasites showed up.

Hoaxing Jewsplained

The fake Nazi death camp: Wikipedia’s longest hoax, exposed!

The story under this Haaretz headline is not what you might expect. The “Nazi death camp” narrative is a jew construct, so naturally we are tempted to think maybe the tribe’s own shameless hoaxing is being exposed. It is, but only indirectly.

This attempt to revise the accepted history of the Shoah on the internet encyclopedia parrots the revised historical narrative currently being trumpeted by the Polish government. In this narrative, the Poles in general – not just the country’s Jewish population – were the main victims of the Nazi occupation. This line attempts to shift the light away from a growing body of research into cases of Polish cooperation and collaboration with the Nazis in the persecution of Jews. The effort to rewrite Polish history on Wikipedia joins Holocaust distortion efforts by Polish think tanks – picked up and echoed by nationalist media outlets – that try to increase the estimate of the number of Poles who perished during the so-called Polocaust, a term that has gained popularity in recent years and is used to describe the mass murder of non-Jewish Poles at the hands of the Nazis. Many times, this also includes minimizing the number of Jews who died during the Holocaust. And while this new Polish narrative has failed to make headway in academia or the world media, on Wikipedia it has thrived.

. . .

One explanation is that though there was no death camp in Warsaw called KL Warschau, there was certainly a concentration camp with that name. The false facts that comprise the death camp hoax – the existence of gas chambers and the 200,000 death toll – managed to survive in Wikipedia because they were inextricably intertwined with real historical facts regarding the Warsaw concentration camp.

. . .

part of what Grabowski calls the “competing victimology” of the Polish right.

“In the beginning of 1990s, a new narrative was being pushed out by nationalists that there was an extermination camp in Warsaw and that there were gas chambers there. But it was totally, but totally, absurd as a theory.

“What you have are small-time concentration installations which are now getting magnified by right-wing conspiracy theories to include hundreds of thousands of Polish victims – their objective is to increase Polish losses and therefore Polish victimhood,” says Grabowski.

The number 200,000 is significant in the context, both scholars explain. Some 200,000 ethnic Poles were indeed killed during the 1944 Polish uprising. Adding another 200,000 (fictitious) Polish deaths would raise the Polish death toll in the city to 400,000 – almost identical to the number of Jews who were murdered in the ghetto.

“By pulling another 200,000 victims out of thin air,” explains Dreifuss, “they’re trying to equate what happened to the Jews during the Holocaust to what happened to Poles during the Holocaust. In this sense, it is also no coincidence that the manner of death was also by gas,” she says, adding: “But it’s just false.”

. . .

According to Icewhiz, waging memewar on Wikipedia], simply the number 200,000 should have served as a red flag, for it would have meant that KL Warschau was a bigger death camp than the likes of Sobibor and Majdanek. That didn’t happen, however, and the disinformation only continued to spread with the help of Polish editors.

. . .

The first time was in 2006, as part of what can only be termed a “Polish cleansing” of the text. In addition to adding the inflated Warsaw death toll, the editor also deleted a line explaining that, “the primary intention of these camps was the extermination of the Jews.” The revision highlights how the attempt to push out the false narrative regarding KL Warschau goes hand in hand with attempts to minimize the Jewish Holocaust and exaggerate the so-called Polocaust.

Fancy footnote work

By piggybacking on a real camp and inflating a real death toll, those peddling the KL Warschau conspiracy theory managed to pass Wikipedia’s first muster. But how did they overcome the Wikipedia community’s demand to attribute and source every claim?

. . .

“Ah, yes, the tunnel that is a gas chamber,” laughs Grabowski, “This is of course a joke,” since a 500-meter long tunnel can hardly serve as a sealed gas chamber. However, this joke has a rich history as a Polish conspiracy theory

. . .

riding on the coattails of the populist wind that swept the current government into power in Poland, the story has taken on a life of its own, assuming a key role in the Polocaust narrative and developing a cult-like following among nationalists.

. . .

A church memorial plaque commemorates the “200,000 victims.” The number is “baseless,” Prof. Dreifuss says.

. . .

“If it could be proved that the Germans had built a gas chamber for the purpose of exterminating non-Jewish Poles, this would undermine the status of the Holocaust as a crime of unique proportions,” Davies went on.

. . .

These kinds of claims and calculations “allow the Poles to say, ‘not only you Jews were murdered with gas,” explains Havi Dreifuss. “But the truth is that Jews and Poles were unequal victims. Poles were victims of a horrible ethnic cleansing, but that was not the systematic annihilation that the Jews faced.

“The current attempt to invent slaughters and victims that never took place is a horrible thing that may actually undermine the real history of the vicious persecution Poles suffered at the hands of Nazi Germany. The truth is that there was no systematized mass murder of the Polish population – and that is of course a good thing. The Holocaust is not something one should envy.”

. . .

“For example,” she continues, “in the [English] article on the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, the fighting forces [that battled the Germans] are misrepresented in the info box on the side. A reader that is not well versed in history could think that it was a joint struggle by four equally important organizations – two Polish groups and two Jewish ones. But that’s not true, the uprising was the result of Jewish actions and the Jewish organizations led the fighting, while Polish groups played an extremely marginal role. There are other much more serious examples.”

. . .

Grabowski explains that “nationalists in Poland don’t care about what’s written in Polish, they already control the public discourse in Poland. They dominate the local narrative, but not the international narrative. That’s why they are flocking in a frenzy to Wikipedia and dedicating so much time and energy to it. I’ve heard there are hundreds of volunteers.”

According to Icewhiz, however, the number is no greater than six or seven: “You don’t need more than that to take over an entire discourse.”

Operation Poland

Icewhiz admits he can be a bit obsessive, and over the past year and a half he has documented almost fanatically what he claims is a systematic attempt by a handful of editors to rewrite the history of the Holocaust. This group, he claims, is comprised of Polish expatriates who have embraced a nationalistic position that is far to the right of the Polish mainstream.

. . .

Grabowski, whose own Wikipedia page was targeted by members of the group Icewhiz describes, is not surprised. “Everything that is related to negative treatment of Jews by Poles during the Holocaust is now being distorted and manipulated – with the goal of promoting a false narrative and sowing confusion on English Wikipedia.”

. . .

Icewhiz claims Poeticbent and Piotrus, for example, were active in rewriting numerous articles dealing with Jewish ghettos, with the goal of including a disproportionate emphasis on heroic rescue of Jews by Poles to overshadow any negative aspects. This kind of editorial skewering is the minutiae of Wikipedia politics, where the battle is over framing as much as facts.

. . .

Most of the examples in this story are taken from Icewhiz’s increasingly quixotic battle against the group of Polish editors.

. . .

A review of Icewhiz’s claims reveals what does indeed look like a concerted attempt by a small group of editors to distort the history of the Holocaust along the lines being espoused by the IPN and the Polish regime.

. . .

Though Icewhiz has earned a bad reputation on Wikipedia, due to his combative personal style and aggressively pro-Israel position, his claims of an encyclopedic conspiracy are not unfounded

. . .

He says the Poles on Wikipedia benefit from an unholy alliance with editors affiliated with the American left – people who are sensitive to claims of victimhood and reluctant to call out anti-Semitism. It is exactly these kinds of claims that have turned many in the Wikipedia community against Icewhiz. For example, a Twitter account allegedly set up by the Israeli to counter the distribution of revised Wikipedia articles online recently got him banned.

This is exactly the type of behavior that has caused Icewhiz to lose his standing within Wikipedia. For many, his past efforts to defend Israel’s good name on Wikipedia is no different than the Polish editors’ attempt to defend Poland’s.

. . .

Icewhiz says that he brought his story to Haaretz because he has all but lost the battle against Polish revision on Wikipedia. Having a respected newspaper vet his claims and publish the story of the hoax plays a key role in his attempt to defend history. By reporting on Polish revisionism on Wikipedia, the facts being purged by Polish editors are preserved as true by a verifiable source, granting him ammunition for his last offensive in the footnote war.

Despite having history on his side, on September 28, Icewhiz lost his case against the group of Polish editors.

. . .

Moreover, they accused the Israeli editor of harassing them on Wikipedia, claiming he was driven by hatred of Poland and Poles.

. . .

After deliberating the case, Wikipedia’s top panel ruled against Icewhiz and he was banned from editing any article related to the subject of Poland and the Holocaust. In their ruling, the panel members accepted the Polish editors claims and said Icewhiz’s use of terms such as “Polocaust” and “Polophile” were “ethnically derogatory.” As a result of their decision, henceforth, any attempt by one editor to label another editor or source as revisionist or anti-Semitic can be considered a form of hate speech on Wikipedia.

What we have here is an example of just how deep jew chutzpathy runs, how shamelessly jews screech when they see someone else trying to follow their playbook, how they attack and psychopathologize their own tribe’s thinking and behavior whenever they believe they’ve caught a glimpse of it reflected in the goyim.

The article is very long, but the excerpts above capture the most relevant points.

Too few non-jews understand that when jews screech about the supposedly holy “six million” supposedly killed by the supposedly demonic “Nazis”, that it isn’t just about continuing a totally absurd conspiracy theory that jews created and promulgated during that war. This screeching, like all their screeching, is part of a much older and darker story.

I happened across a book titled Six Million Open Gates recently. The author gathered together a small sample of the victimology which the jews today accuse the Poles of trying to compete with. The book, like the Haaretz article, makes the totally convincing case that the jews’ victimology really does have no equal. As everyone knows, if only by absorbing it unconsciously through repetition by the jewsmedia, the magical number in the jew narrative is “six million”. What many people don’t realize is just how long the jews have been screeching about their supposed victimhood and attaching it to this magic number. We know now, thanks to the internet, that it predates by at least half a century the fratricidal White-on-White war during which the jews added their even more absurd claims about “Nazi death camps” with “gas chambers”.

What we have here, via Haaretz, is a window into the mind of the jew. We see how jews consciously conspire to do what they perceive to be best for jews, and how they do so by ruthlessly promoting and defending their jew-first victimology. We see how sensitive they are to anyone contradicting their jew-first narrative, how incensed they are by the slightest pushback from non-jews. We see how they perceive the rhetoric of equality as a weapon, and how, especially when they perceive its use mimics their own, they regard it as an existential threat to themselves.

Most White people mistakenly think that the great crime that the “Nazis” (and Germans, and Poles, and Whites generally) are accused of by the jews is that we don’t regard them as equals. It is a fundamental misunderstanding of jew identity and mentality. When someone who looks like us screeches as if they are being treated badly, most Whites instinctively sympathize, because we imagine ourselves in their place. The semitically correct moral of the jews’ “Nazi death camp” narrative is that Whites must sympathize with people specifically because they are not like us. So, some Whites sympathize with jews because we mistake them for us, while others pretend to sympathize because they understand that jews are the most non-White non-us of all. Either way the jews benefit.

Whatever your rationale, rejecting the jews’ “Nazi death camp” narrative can get you the gulag. Social media websites cite the jews’ “Nazi death camp” narrative to justify silencing Whites. The jews don’t see this as an unfair bias in their favor. They see it as unfair that they even have to argue with the lowly goyim at all.

The jews have nothing but antipathy for Whites – whether they see us as Poles, Germans, or otherwise. The grievances of non-jews, even if only directed at other non-jews, are effortlessly discounted and dismissed by the jews.

When jews swarm and screech about some supposed injustice they often try to muddy the water by thrusting some proxy out in front. Occasionally the true nature of the spectacle is made plain when their proxy says something that vexes the jews. The surreal screeching about Trump and “The Squad” is a recent example. The jew cries “LEAVE JEWS OUT OF THIS” as he strikes.

Sometimes the spectacle is nothing but jews screeching at jews. When you dig into these victimological kerfluffles you find nothing but bagelian dialectic, nothing but a more or less disguised debate about what’s best for the jews. The concerns of non-jews are window dressing, utterly secondary and disposable. Back in the 1920s Adolf Hitler saw the most common form of this fakery in the apparent conflict between zionism and liberalism. He called it “this fictitious conflict”.

More generally, the driving force is intersectional jewing, and this driving force is laid as bare as can be in this Haaretz article. Here the jews are clearly grappling with the prevalence and dominance of their own narrative, the supremacy of their own victimology. It presents them with a conundrum. How can they shut down the goyim without interfering with jewing? The answer is to throw off the mask, to proclaim that nobody’s victimology rivals their own, nobody’s narrative is as sacred as their own, nobody’s concerns are as great, nobody’s opinion as worthy of protection, nobody is like jews. Here is just another example of jews themselves saying so.

The Burden of Jewing, Part 2 – “Conversion”

In Part 1 we examined “messianism”, in Part 2 we’ll discuss “conversion”.

As with “messianism”, “conversion” means something different to jews than it does to non-jews. What’s more, jews actively promote this difference in understanding, and use it to their advantage. To put it bluntly, jew “conversion” is a form of identity fraud – a fraud repeatedly and ubiquitously perpetrated by jews collectively, against non-jews collectively, for the benefit of jews collectively, at the expense of non-jews collectively. Cengiz Sisman’s book, The Burden of Silence: Sabbatai Sevi and the Evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish Dönmes, exposes a prominent historical example of this type of fraud.

Examining this particular example sheds light on the more general and recurring pattern. Sisman’s book is a celebration of such jewing, so he only inadvertently highlights the difference in perception between jews and non-jews, and never literally describes the exploitation of it as fraud. Yet there would be no book if “conversion” worked the way non-jews imagine, if it actually turned jews into non-jews. If that were true the descendents of the Sabbatean jews who “converted” into muslims would long ago have become indistinguishable from other Turks and there would be no Dönmes to write about. There would be no crypto-jews of any sort. In the process of explaining how the Dönmes not only exist but have exerted great influence, Sisman divulges the trick that made it possible: Convincing non-jews to imagine jew “converts” are defectors who have abandoned their jewing, even as jews themselves view “conversion” as a continuation of jewing by other means.

Sisman refers to the Dönmes “survival question”, asking how they continued to exist as a distinct people even centuries after their ancestors “converted” to Islam. He finds the answer in their deliberate creation of:

a parallel space and time zone in which they had their own cemeteries, prayer houses, ceremonies, charities, and even courts. In this world, women mostly stayed at home, carrying the culture and transmitting “the knowledge” to future generations, while the men acted in a sort of “go-between” role between the parallel worlds. In their parallel worlds, I argue, the Dönme subsects fashioned and refashioned themselves within a post-messianic and mystical Jewish world, and created their own version of Kabbala.

. . .

The fifth chapter carefully reconstructs the full development of “open secret” or “crypto-communities” in the so-called Dönme dark age in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in relation to similar phenomena such as those experienced by the Frankists in eastern and central Europe. I argue that the period was a very critical moment for the Dönmes since they “silently” developed their idiosyncratic theological arguments and social practices that enabled them to maintain their own parallel messianic self-government. In the meantime, the relationship between the Dönmes and crypto-Sabbateans in Europe never ceased.

Describing its rationale so plainly, in terms of evolution (in the title) and survival (in the text), is a matter-of-fact acknowledgement of the biological nature of crypto-jewing. The “parallel space” the Dönmes created is just as crucial to jewing generally. The main difference between open jewing and crypto-jewing is the degree of secrecy with which jews construct and maintain their own “space”. In any case, jewing exists and continues only because jews consciously distinguish themselves from the non-jews they insinuate themselves among and exploit. Sisman’s tale correctly conveys the impression that crypto-jewing isn’t “forced” upon jews any more than jewing is. It is just another way jews jew.

There are several notorious examples of jews shifting tactics collectively in this way – whereby large groups of jews “convert”, yet continue to operate as a covert group within some larger non-jew group, consciously preserving their genetic and memetic identity, sometimes for centuries, until at some point conditions favor “converting” back. Crypto-jewing is secretive by design, of course, so there are undoubtedly many more examples less known to non-jews. Outside Turkey, and especially outside the Islamic world, the Dönmes themselves are hardly known.

Recall that Sisman helpfully puts sneer quotes around terms with special significance. In the snippet above it denotes the fraud, the “open secret”, known to jews, but not non-jews. Sisman eventually lays bare the essence of this fraud, that jews understand jewness primarily as an immutable heritable trait, rather than merely a state of mind, as they encourage non-jews to imagine:

It is technically impossible for a Jew to change his or her Jewishness. As far as the Jewish law, halakha, is concerned, even though a Jew undergoes the rites of admission to another religious faith and formally renounces the Jewish religion she or he remains a Jew, albeit a sinner (Talmud: Sanhedrin, 44a).

The context for this admission is the “conversion” of the jew “messiah” Sabbatai Sevi, the protagonist of Sisman’s book:

Toward the end of the trial, the interrogators asked Sabbatai to embrace Islam or to be prepared to die. He had come to the palace with the initial aim of converting the sultan but now found himself facing death. What should he have done? Coming from a Sephardic background, steeped in the rabbinic tradition, and familiar with the Marrano experience, he was no doubt well aware of the Jewish attitude to apostasy and martyrdom. When he had to choose between martyrdom and conversion, he chose life, for this act could be justified by the Sephardic tradition. Had he been of the Askenazi origin, his inner dilemma may well have been much more serious.

The issue of conversion and martyrdom in Judaism is very complex. It is technically impossible for a Jew to change his or her Jewishness. As far as the Jewish law, halakha, is concerned, even though a Jew undergoes the rites of admission to another religious faith and formally renounces the Jewish religion she or he remains a Jew, albeit a sinner (Talmud: Sanhedrin, 44a). One, of course, should make a distinction between a voluntary and a forced conversion. The voluntary converts are known as mumar (from the root meaning “to change”), or meshummad (from the root meaning “to persecute or force abandonment of faith”), or apikoros (“heretic”), or kofer (“denier”), or poshe’a Yisrael (“‘transgressor’ Jew”). The forced converts, as in the case of the Marranos, are called anusim. “What was to happen when an idolater forced an Israelite to transgress one of the commandments of the Torah on pain of death?” asks the Mishna Torah of Maimonides. The answer to that question is clear: “He transgressed and did not suffer death because it was said of the commandments that when a man performed them he must live and not die. (Leviticus 18:5). If he is killed and did not transgress, he is guilty of his own life.” However there are exceptions in transgression as is seen in Maimonides’s words: “To what does this word refer? To all commandments, except idolatry, immorality and bloodshed. Regarding these three, if one says ‘transgress one of them or die’ one must die and not transgress.” Since Islam is not an idolatrous religion in Maimonides’s view, it was acceptable to convert to Islam under duress, rather than choosing martyrdom.

Sevi’s original “messianic” plan, according to Sisman, was to “convert” the sultan and other Ottoman leaders, to manipulate them for the benefit of jews. It was only after that plan was thwarted that Sevi felt compelled to “convert” himself, to shift his “messianism” into an another form. Sisman makes it sound more complicated by citing jew pilpul on “conversion”, but this only demonstrates the depth of their familiarity with and ambivalence on the subject. Rather than simply forbidding the supposed “sin”, jews instead fetishize the degrees of trangression crypto-jews may by accused of by their tribemates. The key point is that they all continue to regard each other as tribemates. Obscured by their overheated disagreement over means, their shared “messianic” end, to save the jews, goes entirely unquestioned.

The similar case of Sephardic jewing/crypto-jewing in Iberia, which pre-dates the Ottoman jewing we’re reviewing here, is much better known to Europeans. Even in the Anglosphere the words converso and marrano have since become generic terms for crypto-jews. The terms exist because they describe a repeating pattern of behavior. Likewise, these terms also all have negative connotations, and for non-jews the specific implication is fraud.

The standard jew narrative on “conversion” (or financial fraud, or any other example of jewy malfeasance) inverts reality, portraying jews always as victims rather than as the perpetrators. Sisman’s tale is interesting to the extent it deviates from the standard apology. Sisman instead provides a narrative where jews do have some agency, even if only visible when he compares them to each other. As mentioned in Part 1, Sisman describes, for example, jews as fleeing from the oppression of non-jews elsewhere – primarily Spain and Poland – flocking to the Ottoman empire because there, in their own estimation, they could jew more freely. He cites a lesser known example of crypto-jewing among Persians specifically to contrast it with their situation among Turks:

In 1839, Mashadi Jews in Iran were forced to convert to Islam. While some managed to escape, the rest adopted Islam only outwardly. Most of their descendants emigrated to the West in the twentieth century and returned to Judaism.

This is the more typical and complete sequence of “conversion”. The jews who transformed themselves into Sabbateans and eventually into Dönmes have just not yet shape-shifted back into jews.

Sisman notes that the Sabbateans were not the only jew “converts” among the Turks. For example:

The Catholic priest and historian Henri Gregoire, writing in 1829, claimed that there was another crypto-Jewish community in Salonica whose members were frequently confused with the followers of Sevi. A number of Jewish bankers of this city having been condemned to death by the pasha “some century and a half ago” managed to save their lives and property by undergoing a nominal conversion and embracing Islam—perhaps thirty families.

In trying to distinguish the Sabbateans from other crypto-jews Sisman highlights the overall pattern. Supposedly threatened for jewing openly, the jews switch to crypto-jewing, and thus carry on. Even a sympathetic account can’t help but imply that the jewing is key. As soon as the jews disguise their jewing, taking the “burden of silence” tack, the resistance abates. The jewing doesn’t stop. The harm it causes non-jews is just less likely to be associated with jews.

Sevi was not the first or only would-be “messiah” to “convert”. Maimonides, mentioned above, was “among the foremost rabbinical decisors and philosophers in jewish history, and his copious work comprises a cornerstone of Jewish scholarship”. Sisman cites Maimonides, who is regarded by jews as the authority on “conversion”, specifically because he performed the same disingenuous dance Sevi did, before Sevi did. Maimonides ultimately reverted to open orthodox jewing, inspiring other jews to do the same. Sevi, in contrast, inspired a subset of jews to jew differently, becoming an example for crypto-jews. These jews both personify the complementary tactics – now overt, now covert – by which jews ruthlessly pursue their own jewy interests.

In Sisman’s opinion, “Maimonides’s placement of Christianity closer to idolatry and Islam to monotheism must have been one of the other reasons Jewish conversion to Islam rather than to Christianity was easier in pre-modern times.” Sure. Or Mainonides simply dealt more with Islam than Christianity, and a jew confronted with the reverse circumstance might just as well claim the reverse.

Ethnocentric Europeans tend to believe that their own kind are most easily duped by jews. Some think that Christianity debilitates non-jews, but Islam strengthens them. They’re wrong. For one thing, jews are genetically closer to Turks and Arabs than they are to Europeans. This allows jews to pass more easily among the former than the latter. Also, Islam is not inherently any more antithetical to jewing than Christianity. Both ideologies actually enable jewing, specifically via “conversion”.

Sisman cites another indication that, in Sevi’s day at least, Turks were just as thoroughly jewed as Europeans:

As [Paul] Rycaut notes, the seventeenth-century Ottoman world was very open to converts:

No people in the world have ever been more open to receive all sorts of Nations to them, than they, nor have used more arts to increase the number of those that are called Turks; and it is stranger to consider that from all parts of the world, some of the most dissolute and desperate in wickedness, should flock to these Dominions, to become members and professors of the Mahometan superstition, in that manner that at present, the blood of the Turks is so mixed with that of all sorts of languages, and Nations . . . the English called it Naturalization, the French Enfranchisement; and the Turks call it becoming a Believer.

Sevi was born in the Ottoman empire and lived 40 of his 50 years openly as a jew. Remarkably, even after Sevi presented himself as a straightforward “messiah”, trying to influence others for explicitly jewy reasons, Ottoman authorities did not of their own volition arrest or otherwise threaten him. After Sevi’s “conversion” the sultan only expected him to help “convert” more jews. Sevi, who saw this as the best way forward for jews, did so enthusiastically.

Sisman indicates that the harrassment Sevi and his Sabbateans faced was mainly instigated by other jews. Their primary concern was that the fanfare around Sevi’s new form of subversive jewing might be bad for the jews who were perfectly comfortable jewing more openly. Sisman alludes to this in many places, detailing how influential jews repeatedly sicced the Ottoman authorities on Sevi:

After few years in Salonica, Sabbatai’s “intolerable” and “strange” activities created displeasure among the Jewish authorities, and he was expelled from the city in 1658. Sabbatai went to Istanbul, hoping to find a more “tolerant” Jewish audience.

. . .

once again he was expelled, leaving Istanbul by the end of 1658

. . .

Wearied rabbis in Istanbul had been closely monitoring the news about the emerging messiah. They dispatched a letter to the rabbis of Izmir, stating “the man who spreads those innovations is a heretic, and whosoever kills him will be accounted as one who has saved many souls.”

That’s right. Some jews wanted Sevi, who was trying to save the jews, assassinated because they thought that would be the better way to save the jews.

As the [Sabbatean] movement gained strength, the social and economic life of Izmir was heavily affected by the messianic chaos engulfing it. European merchants expressed concern about the demise of economic life in the city. Reports from cities such as London and Amsterdam show that regular business dealings with the Jews became problematic because of their belief that the End of Days was at hand. Tens of male and female “prophets” were heralding the coming of the Messianic Age on the streets. People were abandoning their daily affairs, and many believers were engaging in penitential practices. Through a Christian lens, Hammer writes that Sabbatai, “the Antichrist,” wrote letters to Jews all around the world when he was in Izmir, and that he called himself the First Created, the only Son of God, the Messiah and Redeemer of Israel. It should be noted that Muslim and Christian observers of the movement differed on one major point: the Muslims perceived the movement mostly within a political framework and referred to it as a source of sedition, whereas the Christians tended to see it mostly from a religious point of view and frequently referred to the protagonist as the Antichrist, which was a very common theme in pre-modern Christian prophecy books.

As a response to the agitation in the city, and rabbinical and European complaints, Sabbatai was ordered to appear before the Ottoman authorities.

It isn’t difficult to grasp what was going on back then. The same thing is happening today with “messiah” Trump.

For the Ottomans, Sabbatai was a “false” Jewish prophet. Abdi refers to him as a Jewish rabbi (haham), and then prophet (peygamber). Silahtar and Raşid add the term cehud (a pejorative term for Jews) to his description. None of the Ottoman chroniclers mentioned that he was a messiah. Why the Ottoman observers called Sabbatai “prophet” and not “messiah” is still an unanswered question. Even Rycaut occasionally refers to him as a prophet. Kömürcüyan mentions that Sabbatai had a stamp that read “Sabbatai, the prophet of the Jews.

Just as few non-jews today comprehend what all the jews swarming and screeching about Trump means, Europeans and Turks did not understand what Sevi represented. Like cuckoo chicks, crying out in pain, the jews create confusion about who is harming whom. Yet there at the center of it all is “messianism” – an indelibly jewy word for an irrepressibly jewy fanaticism.

As sobering as this topic is I laughed out loud when Sisman recounted how another contemporary “messiah”, who totally grokked Sevi’s game, challenged him:

A rabbi from Poland by the name of Nehemiah Cohen came to visit Sabbatai in the fortress. In accordance with the theological argument of a “double messiah,” he argued that he was, in fact, the first messiah, coming as he did from the house of Joseph, who was assumed to have come before the messiah from the House of David, and urged Sabbatai to acknowledge him as such. Sabbatai was not convinced and rejected his offer. Perhaps out of revenge, Nehemya went to Edirne and there converted to Islam. While there he warned the Ottoman authorities about Sabbatai, complaining that he was causing a major social and religious upheaval among the Jews and the Muslims. He then disappeared from history.

Online discussions of the “double messiah” concept are vague. It appears to be an ancient term for their “two jews, three opinions about what’s best for jews” shtick, a “religious” wrapper for their constant sectarian bickering. Just as jews see a potential “anti-semite” in every non-jew, they see a potential “messiah” in every jew, especially themselves. Whether or not it actually happened, the argument between Sevi and Cohen reflects a disagreement not only about who will save the jews, but also the deeper question about who comprises “the jews”. Are jews who only secretly think of themselves as jews still jews? Does it matter if one sect of jews screech at and disavow another? From a non-jew point of view it comes across as nothing more than a two-faced jew charade.

From an objective point of view it is an adaptive biological behavior. The jews assess and argue every issue in the starkest terms, seeing the portent for destruction or salvation of the jews in everything. Subdividing to pursue seemingly opposed tactics helps the jews survive. It enables them to sow division and confusion among non-jews while they remain conscious of themselves as a single collective. Sabbateanism is but one prominent example of this behavior.

The paradoxical impact of the messiah’s conversion was not settled swiftly in Jewish communities. Even a year after the conversion, one could see that the Jews were still accusing each other of harboring false beliefs. Wanting to keep everything under control, nine leading Constantinople rabbis sent a letter to Izmir and other cities, asking the Jewish authorities to suppress all remnants of Sabbateanism and to praise the sultan, since he had rescued Judaism from a great calamity.

. . .

Against this general rabbinical ban, Sabbateans continued their activities clandestinely. In later centuries Ottoman rabbis developed a more neutral attitude toward the Sabbateans in comparison to the European rabbis such as Jacob Sasportas (1610–1698), Naphtali Cohen (1649–1718), Moses Hagiz (1676–1750), and Jacob Emden (1697–1776), who condemned the Sabbateans and pronounced the name of Sabbatai with the addition of “may his name and memory be blotted out.”

Indeed, this is what happened. The “open secret”, the crypto-jewing of the Turks, continued clandestinely. Meanwhile, Sevi and the memory of the Sabbateans was also “blotted out”, effectively disappearing them from history, or at least from the minds of Europeans. The jewing and crypto-jewing continue unabated. Likewise the jew screeching that the sky is always falling on the jews.

It is mistaking jewness for mere religion that makes jew “conversion” seem plausible to non-jews. Jews themselves understand that jewness is a heritable trait. This is the “open secret”. This deception is what angers non-jews whenever it is revealed. The fact that jews do not cease in perpetrating this fraud, even after it has been repeatedly exposed as such, is mute testimony to its intrinsic value to jews. In Chapter 2 Sisman provides an example of this value, arguing that:

the Ottoman authorities perceived [Sabbateanism] as a heretical religious movement (fitne), not as a political revolt with possible military backing (huruc). As a result, they did not feel any urgent need to violently suppress it or kill its leader. The Ottoman accounts are in agreement with the European and Jewish sources in outlining the general trajectory of the movement, but they differ from them in some crucial points. It is the examination of these details that allows us to explore how Sabbatai Sevi b. Mordechai the Messiah became Aziz Mehmet Efendi b. Abdullah the Chief Gatekeeper.

It is good to not be recognized as a threat by your enemy. Better if your enemy doesn’t even see you as an enemy, and allows you to live among them. Better still if your enemy regards you as a potential ally and eagerly seeks to “convert” you in the hope you will provide financing, good press, helpful advice, capable offspring, etc.

Where do non-jews get the ridiculous idea to solicit “converts” from rival tribes? From Abrahamism, created by the tribe that most infamously rejects “converts”. Abrahamism paints jews as the oldest, highest moral authority, the inventors of “messianism”. Supercession gives non-jews a way to “convert” themselves into jews, a way to imagine they are the new jews, the inheritors or most truest interpreters of the oldest, highest moral authority.

In theory Christianity and Islam are rivals of Judaism. In practice they are alternate vehicles for jew “messianism”. Both ideologies were conceived or at least midwived by jews. Both have been cultivated for centuries by a constant stream of jew “converts”, like Sevi and the Sabbateans, who saw their task as indoctrinators, and shamelessly set about training non-jews how to properly save the jews. This same animus is less obvious, but thus all the more insidious, in recent progressive/post-religious ideologies like liberalism and marxism.

All jew-spawned jew-serving ideologies share the same primary directive: To combat “racism” and “anti-semitism”. It’s all about tearing down non-jew tribalism to make the world safe for jew tribalism. Whether this agenda is justified in the service of “god” or “the people”, jews understand it and thereby make it about serving the jews. Meanwhile most non-jews frankly do not understand. The religious call their willful ignorance “faith”. The secular call it “reason”. Either way most non-jews are content to feel righteous.

It’s impossible to overemphasize this point. Whatever jews preach to jews explicitly puts tribalism over ideology. The ideologies jews craft for non-jews encourage the opposite. These ideologies seek to override and replace tribalism. The gist of virtually all jew advice to non-jews is this: “You have no tribe! You have no enemies! You defeat your enemies by treating them like friends! Our enemies are your enemies! KILL THEM!” Jewing enables crypto-jewing which enables jewing. It’s a positive feedback loop.

Many White men have criticized Christianity’s role in this. Sisman’s book illustrates the similar role played by Islam.

Sisman speculates that Sevi’s miraculous transmutation, from rabble-rouser to Chief Gatekeeper, was aided by other jew “converts” already embedded in the sultan’s court. This and other anecdotes indicate that the Turks, under the influence of Islam, misunderstood and underestimated jewing:

During the trial, Sabbatai must have had a hard time explaining himself. He knew some Turkish, since he was smart and born in Ottoman society and lived in the empire for forty years. However, he may not have been sufficiently fluent to pursue a legal/political argument during the trial. One of the palace physicians, Hayatizade Mustafa Efendi, a Jewish convert originally known as Moshe ben Abravanel, would have been the obvious choice to serve as interpreter.

. . .

Sabbatai was not an exceptional convert who was granted an important, real, or honorary position at the palace. For instance, Hayatizade was a paramount
example of what one could get in return for conversion.

Can you guess what happened next?

It seems that Aziz Mehmet [Sevi’s new name], albeit very secretly, resumed his messianic activities after the initial shock of the conversion experience.

. . .

Backed by sultanic authority and his own messianic convictions, Aziz Mehmet undertook the double mission of converting the Jews to Islam and to his cause. He visited synagogues in Edirne, Istanbul, and Salonica, and preached his idiosyncratic doctrine to believers and non-believers alike, sharing his “mystery” with the trustworthy followers. These sermons are almost reminiscent of the forced sermons in Spain in the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries, when the Jews were brought to the churches and forced to listen to proselytizing sermons. According to Tobias Cohen, he “sometimes prayed and behaved like a Jew, and sometimes like a Muslim, and he did queer things.” Since he was preaching in Ladino, the Ottoman escorts were not able to monitor his message in the synagogues.

. . .

Since his activities were sanctioned by the sultan and he was escorted by Ottoman officials, it was impossible to simply physically prevent him from fulfilling his mission. Angiroslo Cohen, the chief rabbi of Edirne, tried his best to avert the danger by alerting his people, but that did little to change the ultimate results. From the Ottoman perspective, Aziz Mehmet’s ability was proven in the following months and years, for many Jews converted to Islam.

. . .

The more new converts he gained, the more privileges he was granted by the Ottoman authorities.

. . .

The early converts considered themselves to be the elect of the “true Israel.”

Sisman’s narrative very plainly describes Sevi and the Sabbateans as “converting” because they considered that the best way to continue their “messianism”. Rather than an anomaly, critical readers will see the Sabbatean case as typical, and in turn see the standard jew narrative – that jews are always and everywhere oppressed – for the lie it is. Even when Sisman himself echoes the “forcing” and “escaping” of the standard jew narrative it rings hollow. In the context of his celebration of Sabbateanism we see that rhetoric all the more clearly as a reflection of jews’ own serial interloping, compulsively imposing themselves and inflicting their toxic save-the-jews ideologies (not to mention the incidental material depredations) upon one group of non-jews after another.

George Lincoln Rockwell insightfully caricatured the characteristically whiny hostility of jewing in The Fable of the Ducks and the Hens. The story jews tell their current hosts shifts all the blame onto their previous hosts, even as they repeat the same parasitic behavior – infiltrating, manipulating, exploiting, destroying, migrating – over and over again.

The Burden of Jewing, Part 1 – “Messianism”

I’m halfway through The Burden of Silence: Sabbatai Sevi and the Evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish Dönmes, written by Cengiz Sisman and published in 2015. This is a good place to pause and summarize my impressions so far. I wanted to learn more about the secretive crypto-jews of Turkey, the Donmeh or Dönmes, and it seems that the earlier, screechier phase of their “silent” jewing is worthy of special attention.

The first half of the book focuses on the origin of the Dönmes in the Ottoman empire circa the 1660s. It is essentially a biography of the rabbi Sabbatai Sevi, and also sketches out the Sabattean movement, the fanatic sect of jews Sevi inspired. At the time, jewing was relatively open and widespread, and it was relatively well recognized and documented as jewing even by non-jews. Of course, the extent and depth of this jewing was not well known and not properly understood, even by most contemporary non-jew observers.

The story unfolds on the margin of Europe, and remains on the margin of White minds, but the consequences run deep and continue to reverberate. The subject is promising – an exposé of centuries worth of secretive jewing – but what the author delivers is more tribute than revelation. The book is advertised as the “first monograph on Sabbateanism” because it represents the first attempt to integrate contemporary non-jew sources with the jealously guarded jew narrative. Non-jew sources are cited, but primarily to bolster those aspects of the story which are least interesting to non-jews – the speculative, nit-picking digressions concerning who said or did what and where, based on still scant evidence.

Thankfully, there are only a few sections where Sisman takes for granted that his reader is familiar with (or cares about) some point of jewy orthodoxy. His prose is lucid and not larded with the histrionics usually found in jew versions of history. And it is not difficult to see in this tale concerning one obscure sect of jews, in one particular place, the outlines of more general patterns and the far broader impact jewing has had across space and time. On the surface Sisman describes how the jewiest jews jewed the Turks. But he is also, though sometimes between the lines, describing jewing more generally.

The dual nature of his tale starts with the title, The Burden of Silence. This might seem to refer only to the Dönmes and their fraud, but it applies just as much to The Tribe as a whole. This is just one of many frauds their tribalist criminal code of silence has abetted.

A more honest title would have been Such a Burden to Trick the Goyim, Time and Again, Without Gloating. As with any apology for jew crypsis, you must imagine the “burden” of the jew, “forced” to lie and disguise themselves. Imagine the “silence” of not being able to screech freely, as a jew, and having to screech at the filthy goyim while posing as a fellow goy. Imagine the “trauma” of having to manipulate the goyim you are feeding upon.

Imagine Sisman’s burden, having to jewsplain how jews are the victims, even while describing their success in duping their marks. Here’s how he lays out his task in his introduction:

In this book, in a set of connected arguments, I show how Sabbatean messianism found receptive religio-socio-political conditions throughout much of the early modern world at an astonishing speed. In response, the Ottoman authorities devised various measures to contain the movement, but they were confronted by crypto-Jewish Dönmes using flexible identities to evade external interference.

. . .

Even “emancipated” Dönmes in the twentieth century continued to carry a somewhat traumatic and secularized form of the burden of silence with them as do many Dönmes today who hold on to this silence about their past to safeguard their positions in Muslim society.

Although the Dönmes maintained an impenetrable and “forced” silence concerning their private practices and beliefs, their existence had always been an “open secret.” Repressed feelings due to the practice of a burden of silence, added yet another layer to the complexity of Dönme history and created a form of cognitive dissonance, a trauma, or, as Houman Sarshar has characterized it in another context, “the anxiety of remembrance” of the past. For some, there is no greater torment than bearing an untold story inside.

Throughout the book Sisman makes liberal use of sneer quotes, as I do, to highlight terms of special significance, especially terms which mean different things to jews and non-jews.

Secret and semi-secret societies such as the Dönmes are inherently fascinating but pose numerous challenges as a subject of academic inquiry. Not only is there a paucity of sources because of their silence, but writing on the silence itself raises a moral dilemma about disclosing the society’s “secrets.” The contemporary existence of the Dönme community makes writing about it or its members even harder. To overcome such challenges, a researcher needs to develop new methodological approaches, particularly because nothing is simple or can be taken at face value in the Dönme histories. One needs to remain constantly aware of the capricious nature of right and wrong in this context. Everything has multiple layers of meaning.

Is Sisman a Dönme? He doesn’t say, but his account of Dönme beliefs and history is told from an entirely sympathetic insider’s perspective. He rejects certain negative aspects of the mainstream jew narrative on Sabbatai and the Sabbateans. He admits to purposefully withholding some information to protect the still active, still secret jews.

The mainstream jew narrative on Sabbatai and the Sabbateans is that they were heretics, bad jews. They claim the Dönmes were never real jews, never had any real influence, and exist today only in the minds of “conspiracy theorists”. In a short interview in 2017 Sisman staked out his two main differences with this mainstream narrative. First, he emphasized that the Dönme see themselves not as jews but as “messianic jews”. Second, he summarized his thesis, which is that these secret super-jews have had a profound influence.

In the interview Sisman also says he wanted to counter “conspiracists”. He spells out this desire in his book’s introduction:

The topic of the Dönmes is currently one of the most controversial conspiracy-prone subjects in modern Turkey and in some parts of the Middle East and has been the subject of several speculative and conspiratorial works (and seems likely to be the topic of several new studies in the future). Consequently, I always felt a need for nonsensational academic works about the Dönmes to counterbalance those controversial perspectives without externalizing, homogenizing, and stereotyping them. The conspiracy theories—mostly, but not entirely, emanating from the religious right—would have the Dönmes as a secret branch of world Jewry or, alternatively, Zionism, that undermined the Ottoman regime and played a central role in the empire’s final demise in order to replace it with a secular Turkish republic.

This is the main point on which Sisman agrees with the mainstream jew narrative. He sees Europeans and Turks, to the extent we exist at all, as the bad guys. His book is a celebration of jew conspiracy, a history of jews conspiring to outwit, outplay, and outlast the goyim. Naturally he dislikes “conspiracists” and their “conspiracy theories” taking a negative view of that same jewing. The “silent” subtext of his book is that the jews and their dupes are opposites, enemies! That jews should know and the goyim shouldn’t is the very key to how jewing works, how it survives, not some accident of history.

Sisman saves most of his argument concerning the outsized influence of jewing, and specifically the central role the Dönmes secretly played in the Ottoman empire’s demise and replacement with a secular “liberal” Turkish republic, for the latter half of his book. We’ll get to that later. His main point in the first half of the book is that the influence of the Sabbatean phase of this jewing “was felt even more strongly outside the empire borders”. In other words, felt more among Europeans than among Turks.

The following long snippet contains that argument, and conveys Sisman’s own speculative, conspiratorial style. It also illustrates one of the more general patterns of jewing he touches upon throughout the book. “Messianism.” When jews babble about “repairing the world” to suit “G-d”, what they’re talking about is manipulating the goyim to suit jews. Sabbatai’s “messianism” was a particularly acute display of this characteristic jew behavior, just one example of how their shameless jew-serving moralizing has repeatedly turned their host societies inside out and upside down.

Here Sisman dryly recounts the impact of Sabbateanism upon a world already profoundly shaped by prior jew-driven upheavals:

The common assumption about the magnitude and impact of the movement, mostly originating from narrative sources, was that the world Jewry, including the communities of both the Ottoman Empire and Europe, were overwhelmed by the Sabbatean euphoria during its heyday. Based on that assumption, many Ottomanists and Jewish scholars thought that the movement had a major destructive impact on the already declining Jewish communities.

Examining the Ottoman context of the movement forces us to revise some of these assumptions. First, the movement was not as big in the Ottoman Empire as it was in Europe. Second, the impact of the movement did not pose a major threat to the fate of Ottoman Jewry. Why was the Sabbatean movement perceived to have been as such in modern scholarship, then? Earlier responses to this question focused on Christian millenarian expectations, which calculated that the coming of the messiah and the end of time would occur in the year 1666. Such expectations, it was argued, built up a massive messianic expectation in Europe and, that coupled with Jewish messianic expectations, fueled the rapid dissemination of the Sabbatean movement in Europe.

In challenging this argument, Richard Popkin, for example, claimed that seventeenth-century Europeans and, following them, many modern researchers were misled by the writings of contemporaneous Christian observers of the movement, such as English royalists Paul Rycaut and John Evelyn, who deliberately magnified the success and failure of the movement in order to both ridicule the Jews and to dash the expectations of home-grown non-conformist millenarians. Without refuting the validity of this explanation, I think that there was yet another factor behind the rapid dissemination of the movement in Europe, particularly among millenarian circles in the Reformed countries: the prophecies of “the doom of the Turkish empire.” According to an age-old Christian prophecy, there was an inherent connection between Christian millenarianism and Jewish messianic expectations. Jews were supposed to convert to Christianity and then return to the Holy Land before the Second Coming of Jesus. And the notorious date of 1666 was calculated as the date for the rise of the Antichrist—the Jewish Messiah. Ironically, the Christian Mary was seen as a supreme she-devil, demonic counterpart to the presence of God, the Shekhina, according to some Kabbalistic traditions in those times. There was one “stumbling block” to realizing this project in its entirety. The Holy Land was under Turkish rule in those days, and it was supposed to be redeemed from Turkish hands. A Jewish messiah, or Antichrist, arising from the East was seen as a sign on the way to the fulfillment of the prophecy. In other words, Sevi, coming from the East, would bring an end to the “Turkish menace,” which had posed a threat to European ambitions for centuries, leading to the redemption of the Holy Land and preparation of the Jews for conversion to Christianity. Seventeenth-century books of Christian prophecy are filled with this account of the connection between Turkish doom, Jewish conversion, and Christian salvation, as reflected in the following quotation.

Turks running over all nations, as a Plague (following Antichrist) upon the Christian world. God hath purposed to destroy [Turks] utterly; that the way of the kings of the EAST mighty be prepared. By the king of the East, we are to understand the Jews who are called Kings. . . . The way that is to be prepared for the Jews is two-fold. First, their conversion and, second, for their return unto their own Land, by taking the stumbling-block out of their way. The Papists are a very great stumbling block unto the conversion of the Jews; and the Turks are a great impediment unto their return unto their own Land, unto which God hath promised to bring them.

Influenced by these kinds of millenarian and royalist writings, most narrative sources agree that the movement brought chaos to the commerce and daily affairs of the empire.

The more things change, the more they stay the same. Update “Turks” to “Islamists” and that 17th century quote still fits fundamentalist Christian thinking. It fits other, more secular forms of jewhadist thinking as well. What’s reflected in this “age-old Christian prophecy” is the power of jew moralizing and narrative.

The idea behind it all is “messianism” – a jewy word for a jewy idea whose origin long predates Christianity or Islam. Lots of non-jew dupes have adopted and lamely tried to adapt the idea for themselves, even to the point of imagining themselves as the “real” jews. However distorted that idea, the crux of it remains: Fight to save the jews, because the jews say so.

Sisman never draws a direct analogy, but in Sabbatai Sevi he describes a latter-day Jesus. No generic prophet, but an iconoclastic rabbi who specifically presented himself as a “messiah”, as a savior of jews. Sabbatai comes across as an anti-“messiah” to Christians exactly because they prefer a previous version of the story, they’ve already accepted another jew as their “messiah”.

What may appear to be a conflict between opposites is in fact just the usual clash of jew narratives. The disagreement over methods disguises the more fundamental agreement over who must benefit. Generally speaking, the game is: Two jews, three opinions about what’s best for the jews. In this case the game is: Two “messiahs”, three opinions about how to save the jews. This view of jew movements generally is borne out in Sisman’s tale about Sabbatai and the Sabbateans.

The first thing to understand about the jews who became Sabbateans, and eventually Dönmes, is that they were the descendants of jews who had long and successfully preyed upon a variety of goyim. This is the jew normal. However diverse their travels, however different their methods and modes of jewing, they see themselves as a collective, utterly distinct from and at odds with the people among whom they live:

The Ottoman Jews came from different parts of the world and over centuries became an integral part of this Ottoman economy and society and occupied important, if not unique, positions such as ambassadors, political advisors, tax collectors, private bankers, Ocakbezirganis (the merchant-banker of the Janissary corps), physicians, and court musicians.

. . .

At the end of the fifteenth century, Rabbi Tsarfati of Edirne, in his well-known letter to European Jewry, described the Ottoman Empire not merely as a place of refuge but also as a land of economic opportunity where, unlike anywhere else, Jews could live and practice their religion freely. This call caused a wave of Askhenazi migration to the empire. Then came the Sephardic Jews and Marranos, who had been chastised and expelled from the Iberian Peninsula in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Things then and there were much like they are here today. The jews are the original “refugees”, and it is their narrative, their “messianism” in one form or another, which empowers them to magically wander across the borders of states which are only ostensibly ruled by hostile non-jews. The Ottomans, for example, had their own President Kushner:

For example, Capsali, using a messianic vocabulary, likened Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent to King Solomon, as an emancipator and protector of the Jews.

Sisman attributes the rise of Sabbateanism among jews inside the Ottoman empire to their collective consciousness and sense of common cause with jews elsewhere:

A massacre in neighboring Poland in 1648 connected the stories of Sabbatai, the Ottoman Empire, and Poland. In 1648, the Ukrainian officer Bogdan Chmielnicki (1594–1657), with the support of the Tatar Khan of Crimea, incited the local peasants to fight against their Polish overlords and brutally killed thousands of people, including Jews. On the assumption that the Jews were allied with the Polish nobility and served them as purveyors, tax collectors, and financial advisors, the Cossacks massacred them. It is estimated that 100,000–200,000 Jews were killed during the revolt in 1648–1649. This event introduced the Cossack term “pogrom” into our vocabulary.

Of course “holocaust” has been introduced into “our” vocabulary in the same way and for the same reason. Because the jewsmedia broadcasts “messianism”, it broadcasts jew fears and fictions as facts. What’s all-important, according to the jewsmedia, is that somebody somehow get the six million to safety.

When the news from the Chmielnicki massacres reached Izmir in the 1648s, Sevi was still enrapt in his own world, studying the Kabbalistic texts about the nature of the Jewish messiah. We do not know for sure whether he was influenced by this terrible news that put the Jewish world in such a state of shock, but possibly for the first time in 1648, Sabbatai proclaimed himself the long-awaited messiah and uttered in public the Tetragrammaton, the ineffable name of God, which Jews had been forbidden to pronounce since the destruction of the Second Temple. As contemporary Armenian historian Arakel (d. 1670) confirms, he said “I am that savior and I have come to save Israel.”

It is worth repeating that “messianism” is particularist, it specifically concerns saving the jews. It is complemented by jew atrocity hoaxing, which specifically concerns generating sympathy for jews. Both are characteristic expressions of jew tribalism, and the frequency and intensity with which they manifest is an indirect measure of the strength of that tribalism.

Making sense of Sabbateanism is not difficult. Sabbatai Sevi imagined a new way of saving the jews. The jews who more or less agreed with him became the Sabbateans. The jews who preferred the current way of going about it regarded them as heretics. Though the details were different, the thrust of this Sabbatean-flavored “messianism” was neither unique nor uncommon:

As amply demonstrated in studies on Hassidism, another widespread Jewish mystical-messianic movement in Eastern Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, studying the socioeconomic and cultural context of the religious movements provides us a deeper understanding of their developments and their connection to other histories. Ruderman, with the same concern in mind, demonstrates how Jew communities in the early modern period were linked to one another in fascinating ways. To him, especially two early modern figures, Sabbatai Sevi and Marrano-origin Baruch Spinoza, changed Jewish religious and cultural landscapes forever.

Whereas Europeans see Spinoza ambiguously, as a secular figure, jews see him more accurately as a “messiah” figure. As a key proponent of the Enlightenment, Spinoza’s “messianism” had a tremendous impact on Europeans. The “classical liberalism” which sprang from that upheaval is still being actively promoted by “right”-posing jews. It amounts to preaching that it is the height of reason is to renounce tribalism, because as individuals we can better protect “minorities”, like The Tribe. As Ben Tillman once pointedly put it:

So, we have a Jewish intellectual milieu (connected by the Jewish neural network to all other such milieux), out of which comes an intellectual movement of atomisation – the ultimate individualist strategy – the absolute worst strategy we could adopt if we were to face subsequent competition with the Jewish or any other competing group. Might this not be the ultimate in the “culture of critique”? The counterpoint to chapter 5 of Separation and Its Discontents?

Three possibilities come to mind. The first is that the Enlightenment ideals that were the “antithesis” of Judaism were conceptualized by the Jewish community and sold to the gullible goyim. The second is that these ideals were a spontaneous (though ultimately maladaptive) creation of the European intellect reacting to the Jewish presence. The third, which seems most likely, is some combination of the two. Each of these possibilities, however, is dependent on the presence of Jews and/or Jewish memes, the putative “germs”.

The pattern of behavior Kevin MacDonald identified and calls jewish intellectual movements can be better understood as a secularized expression of the jews’ propensity to spawn “mystical-messianic movements”. Indeed, Sisman’s The Burden of Silence is about one form of movement changing into the other. It traces how Sabbateanism, an overtly jewy movement aimed at saving the jews, transmuted into a crypto-jewy movement pursuing the same goal by a different path. The takeaway, for non-jews, is that crypsis, or “silent” jewing, is only the continuation of jewing by other means.

When Relentless Remorseless Exterminating Machines Control the Media

Revealing themselves and their tricks, again: The Secret Jewish History Of “Alien”.

Most of the “secret” connections are tenuous, having to do with media being totally jewed. It’s all just fluff padding out the core truth:

One might also consider the alien lifeform itself as an embodiment of the Jewish condition. Alone, wandering in space, it is as Ash calls it, a “survivor.” The organic-machine combination gives it an androgynous quality (it is a female entity but played by a male actor, Bolaji Badejo), again something which has been leveled historically at Jewish men in particular. Technically known as a Xenomorph, its ability to blend into the surroundings of the spaceship suggest a gift for mimicry – a hallmark of the Jewish condition — echoing that of the Transformers.

The very name of the film also suggests how Jewish immigrants have been perceived in Europe and the United States as reflected in the anti-immigrant legislation in Britain specifically designed to curb a Jewish “invasion,” The Aliens Act of 1905.

. . .

Finally, the alien is a relentless, remorseless exterminating machine. All biological organisms are its potential victims. In the prequel “Prometheus,” a crew member describes a pile of corpses he has stumbled upon as resembling a “Holocaust picture.” Thus, it has even been asked, “Can we say that behind those murderous vagina dentata of “Alien,” these atrocities of the twentieth century lurk?

They didn’t give the alien any lines because it would have sounded like nasally screeching in yiddish, letting the goyim know too quickly.