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The Burden of Jewing, Part 1

I’m halfway through The Burden of Silence: Sabbatai Sevi and the Evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish Dönmes, written by Cengiz Sisman and published in 2015. This is a good place to pause and summarize my impressions so far. I wanted to learn more about the secretive crypto-jews of Turkey, the Donmeh or Dönmes, and it seems that the earlier, screechier phase of their “silent” jewing is worthy of special attention.

The first half of the book focuses on the origin of the Dönmes in the Ottoman empire circa the 1660s. It is essentially a biography of the rabbi Sabbatai Sevi, and also sketches out the Sabattean movement, the fanatic sect of jews Sevi inspired. At the time, jewing was relatively open and widespread, and it was relatively well recognized and documented as jewing even by non-jews. Of course, the extent and depth of this jewing was not well known and not properly understood, even by most contemporary non-jew observers.

The story unfolds on the margin of Europe, and remains on the margin of White minds, but the consequences run deep and continue to reverberate. The subject is promising – an exposé of centuries worth of secretive jewing – but what the author delivers is more tribute than revelation. The book is advertised as the “first monograph on Sabbateanism” because it represents the first attempt to integrate contemporary non-jew sources with the jealously guarded jew narrative. Non-jew sources are cited, but primarily to bolster those aspects of the story which are least interesting to non-jews – the speculative, nit-picking digressions concerning who said or did what and where, based on still scant evidence.

Thankfully, there are only a few sections where Sisman takes for granted that his reader is familiar with (or cares about) some point of jewy orthodoxy. His prose is lucid and not larded with the histrionics usually found in jew versions of history. And it is not difficult to see in this tale concerning one obscure sect of jews, in one particular place, the outlines of more general patterns and the far broader impact jewing has had across space and time. On the surface Sisman describes how the jewiest jews jewed the Turks. But he is also, though sometimes between the lines, describing jewing more generally.

The dual nature of his tale starts with the title, The Burden of Silence. This might seem to refer only to the Dönmes and their fraud, but it applies just as much to The Tribe as a whole. This is just one of many frauds their tribalist criminal code of silence has abetted.

A more honest title would have been Such a Burden to Trick the Goyim, Time and Again, Without Gloating. As with any apology for jew crypsis, you must imagine the “burden” of the jew, “forced” to lie and disguise themselves. Imagine the “silence” of not being able to screech freely, as a jew, and having to screech at the filthy goyim while posing as a fellow goy. Imagine the “trauma” of having to manipulate the goyim you are feeding upon.

Imagine Sisman’s burden, having to jewsplain how jews are the victims, even while describing their success in duping their marks. Here’s how he lays out his task in his introduction:

In this book, in a set of connected arguments, I show how Sabbatean messianism found receptive religio-socio-political conditions throughout much of the early modern world at an astonishing speed. In response, the Ottoman authorities devised various measures to contain the movement, but they were confronted by crypto-Jewish Dönmes using flexible identities to evade external interference.

. . .

Even “emancipated” Dönmes in the twentieth century continued to carry a somewhat traumatic and secularized form of the burden of silence with them as do many Dönmes today who hold on to this silence about their past to safeguard their positions in Muslim society.

Although the Dönmes maintained an impenetrable and “forced” silence concerning their private practices and beliefs, their existence had always been an “open secret.” Repressed feelings due to the practice of a burden of silence, added yet another layer to the complexity of Dönme history and created a form of cognitive dissonance, a trauma, or, as Houman Sarshar has characterized it in another context, “the anxiety of remembrance” of the past. For some, there is no greater torment than bearing an untold story inside.

Throughout the book Sisman makes liberal use of sneer quotes, as I do, to highlight terms of special significance, especially terms which mean different things to jews and non-jews.

Secret and semi-secret societies such as the Dönmes are inherently fascinating but pose numerous challenges as a subject of academic inquiry. Not only is there a paucity of sources because of their silence, but writing on the silence itself raises a moral dilemma about disclosing the society’s “secrets.” The contemporary existence of the Dönme community makes writing about it or its members even harder. To overcome such challenges, a researcher needs to develop new methodological approaches, particularly because nothing is simple or can be taken at face value in the Dönme histories. One needs to remain constantly aware of the capricious nature of right and wrong in this context. Everything has multiple layers of meaning.

Is Sisman a Dönme? He doesn’t say, but his account of Dönme beliefs and history is told from an entirely sympathetic insider’s perspective. He rejects certain negative aspects of the mainstream jew narrative on Sabbatai and the Sabbateans. He admits to purposefully withholding some information to protect the still active, still secret jews.

The mainstream jew narrative on Sabbatai and the Sabbateans is that they were heretics, bad jews. They claim the Dönmes were never real jews, never had any real influence, and exist today only in the minds of “conspiracy theorists”. In a short interview in 2017 Sisman staked out his two main differences with this mainstream narrative. First, he emphasized that the Dönme see themselves not as jews but as “messianic jews”. Second, he summarized his thesis, which is that these secret super-jews have had a profound influence.

In the interview Sisman also says he wanted to counter “conspiracists”. He spells out this desire in his book’s introduction:

The topic of the Dönmes is currently one of the most controversial conspiracy-prone subjects in modern Turkey and in some parts of the Middle East and has been the subject of several speculative and conspiratorial works (and seems likely to be the topic of several new studies in the future). Consequently, I always felt a need for nonsensational academic works about the Dönmes to counterbalance those controversial perspectives without externalizing, homogenizing, and stereotyping them. The conspiracy theories—mostly, but not entirely, emanating from the religious right—would have the Dönmes as a secret branch of world Jewry or, alternatively, Zionism, that undermined the Ottoman regime and played a central role in the empire’s final demise in order to replace it with a secular Turkish republic.

This is the main point on which Sisman agrees with the mainstream jew narrative. He sees Europeans and Turks, to the extent we exist at all, as the bad guys. His book is a celebration of jew conspiracy, a history of jews conspiring to outwit, outplay, and outlast the goyim. Naturally he dislikes “conspiracists” and their “conspiracy theories” taking a negative view of that same jewing. The “silent” subtext of his book is that the jews and their dupes are opposites, enemies! That jews should know and the goyim shouldn’t is the very key to how jewing works, how it survives, not some accident of history.

Sisman saves most of his argument concerning the outsized influence of jewing, and specifically the central role the Dönmes secretly played in the Ottoman empire’s demise and replacement with a secular “liberal” Turkish republic, for the latter half of his book. We’ll get to that later. His main point in the first half of the book is that the influence of the Sabbatean phase of this jewing “was felt even more strongly outside the empire borders”. In other words, felt more among Europeans than among Turks.

The following long snippet contains that argument, and conveys Sisman’s own speculative, conspiratorial style. It also illustrates one of the more general patterns of jewing he touches upon throughout the book. “Messianism.” When jews babble about “repairing the world” to suit “G-d”, what they’re talking about is manipulating the goyim to suit jews. Sabbatai’s “messianism” was a particularly acute display of this characteristic jew behavior, just one example of how their shameless jew-serving moralizing has repeatedly turned their host societies inside out and upside down.

Here Sisman dryly recounts the impact of Sabbateanism upon a world already profoundly shaped by prior jew-driven upheavals:

The common assumption about the magnitude and impact of the movement, mostly originating from narrative sources, was that the world Jewry, including the communities of both the Ottoman Empire and Europe, were overwhelmed by the Sabbatean euphoria during its heyday. Based on that assumption, many Ottomanists and Jewish scholars thought that the movement had a major destructive impact on the already declining Jewish communities.

Examining the Ottoman context of the movement forces us to revise some of these assumptions. First, the movement was not as big in the Ottoman Empire as it was in Europe. Second, the impact of the movement did not pose a major threat to the fate of Ottoman Jewry. Why was the Sabbatean movement perceived to have been as such in modern scholarship, then? Earlier responses to this question focused on Christian millenarian expectations, which calculated that the coming of the messiah and the end of time would occur in the year 1666. Such expectations, it was argued, built up a massive messianic expectation in Europe and, that coupled with Jewish messianic expectations, fueled the rapid dissemination of the Sabbatean movement in Europe.

In challenging this argument, Richard Popkin, for example, claimed that seventeenth-century Europeans and, following them, many modern researchers were misled by the writings of contemporaneous Christian observers of the movement, such as English royalists Paul Rycaut and John Evelyn, who deliberately magnified the success and failure of the movement in order to both ridicule the Jews and to dash the expectations of home-grown non-conformist millenarians. Without refuting the validity of this explanation, I think that there was yet another factor behind the rapid dissemination of the movement in Europe, particularly among millenarian circles in the Reformed countries: the prophecies of “the doom of the Turkish empire.” According to an age-old Christian prophecy, there was an inherent connection between Christian millenarianism and Jewish messianic expectations. Jews were supposed to convert to Christianity and then return to the Holy Land before the Second Coming of Jesus. And the notorious date of 1666 was calculated as the date for the rise of the Antichrist—the Jewish Messiah. Ironically, the Christian Mary was seen as a supreme she-devil, demonic counterpart to the presence of God, the Shekhina, according to some Kabbalistic traditions in those times. There was one “stumbling block” to realizing this project in its entirety. The Holy Land was under Turkish rule in those days, and it was supposed to be redeemed from Turkish hands. A Jewish messiah, or Antichrist, arising from the East was seen as a sign on the way to the fulfillment of the prophecy. In other words, Sevi, coming from the East, would bring an end to the “Turkish menace,” which had posed a threat to European ambitions for centuries, leading to the redemption of the Holy Land and preparation of the Jews for conversion to Christianity. Seventeenth-century books of Christian prophecy are filled with this account of the connection between Turkish doom, Jewish conversion, and Christian salvation, as reflected in the following quotation.

Turks running over all nations, as a Plague (following Antichrist) upon the Christian world. God hath purposed to destroy [Turks] utterly; that the way of the kings of the EAST mighty be prepared. By the king of the East, we are to understand the Jews who are called Kings. . . . The way that is to be prepared for the Jews is two-fold. First, their conversion and, second, for their return unto their own Land, by taking the stumbling-block out of their way. The Papists are a very great stumbling block unto the conversion of the Jews; and the Turks are a great impediment unto their return unto their own Land, unto which God hath promised to bring them.

Influenced by these kinds of millenarian and royalist writings, most narrative sources agree that the movement brought chaos to the commerce and daily affairs of the empire.

The more things change, the more they stay the same. Update “Turks” to “Islamists” and that 17th century quote still fits fundamentalist Christian thinking. It fits other, more secular forms of jewhadist thinking as well. What’s reflected in this “age-old Christian prophecy” is the power of jew moralizing and narrative.

The idea behind it all is “messianism” – a jewy word for a jewy idea whose origin long predates Christianity or Islam. Lots of non-jew dupes have adopted and lamely tried to adapt the idea for themselves, even to the point of imagining themselves as the “real” jews. However distorted that idea, the crux of it remains: Fight to save the jews, because the jews say so.

Sisman never draws a direct analogy, but in Sabbatai Sevi he describes a latter-day Jesus. No generic prophet, but an iconoclastic rabbi who specifically presented himself as a “messiah”, as a savior of jews. Sabbatai comes across as an anti-“messiah” to Christians exactly because they prefer a previous version of the story, they’ve already accepted another jew as their “messiah”.

What may appear to be a conflict between opposites is in fact just the usual clash of jew narratives. The disagreement over methods disguises the more fundamental agreement over who must benefit. Generally speaking, the game is: Two jews, three opinions about what’s best for the jews. In this case the game is: Two “messiahs”, three opinions about how to save the jews. This view of jew movements generally is borne out in Sisman’s tale about Sabbatai and the Sabbateans.

The first thing to understand about the jews who became Sabbateans, and eventually Dönmes, is that they were the descendants of jews who had long and successfully preyed upon a variety of goyim. This is the jew normal. However diverse their travels, however different their methods and modes of jewing, they see themselves as a collective, utterly distinct from and at odds with the people among whom they live:

The Ottoman Jews came from different parts of the world and over centuries became an integral part of this Ottoman economy and society and occupied important, if not unique, positions such as ambassadors, political advisors, tax collectors, private bankers, Ocakbezirganis (the merchant-banker of the Janissary corps), physicians, and court musicians.

. . .

At the end of the fifteenth century, Rabbi Tsarfati of Edirne, in his well-known letter to European Jewry, described the Ottoman Empire not merely as a place of refuge but also as a land of economic opportunity where, unlike anywhere else, Jews could live and practice their religion freely. This call caused a wave of Askhenazi migration to the empire. Then came the Sephardic Jews and Marranos, who had been chastised and expelled from the Iberian Peninsula in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Things then and there were much like they are here today. The jews are the original “refugees”, and it is their narrative, their “messianism” in one form or another, which empowers them to magically wander across the borders of states which are only ostensibly ruled by hostile non-jews. The Ottomans, for example, had their own President Kushner:

For example, Capsali, using a messianic vocabulary, likened Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent to King Solomon, as an emancipator and protector of the Jews.

Sisman attributes the rise of Sabbateanism among jews inside the Ottoman empire to their collective consciousness and sense of common cause with jews elsewhere:

A massacre in neighboring Poland in 1648 connected the stories of Sabbatai, the Ottoman Empire, and Poland. In 1648, the Ukrainian officer Bogdan Chmielnicki (1594–1657), with the support of the Tatar Khan of Crimea, incited the local peasants to fight against their Polish overlords and brutally killed thousands of people, including Jews. On the assumption that the Jews were allied with the Polish nobility and served them as purveyors, tax collectors, and financial advisors, the Cossacks massacred them. It is estimated that 100,000–200,000 Jews were killed during the revolt in 1648–1649. This event introduced the Cossack term “pogrom” into our vocabulary.

Of course “holocaust” has been introduced into “our” vocabulary in the same way and for the same reason. Because the jewsmedia broadcasts “messianism”, it broadcasts jew fears and fictions as facts. What’s all-important, according to the jewsmedia, is that somebody somehow get the six million to safety.

When the news from the Chmielnicki massacres reached Izmir in the 1648s, Sevi was still enrapt in his own world, studying the Kabbalistic texts about the nature of the Jewish messiah. We do not know for sure whether he was influenced by this terrible news that put the Jewish world in such a state of shock, but possibly for the first time in 1648, Sabbatai proclaimed himself the long-awaited messiah and uttered in public the Tetragrammaton, the ineffable name of God, which Jews had been forbidden to pronounce since the destruction of the Second Temple. As contemporary Armenian historian Arakel (d. 1670) confirms, he said “I am that savior and I have come to save Israel.”

It is worth repeating that “messianism” is particularist, it specifically concerns saving the jews. It is complemented by jew atrocity hoaxing, which specifically concerns generating sympathy for jews. Both are characteristic expressions of jew tribalism, and the frequency and intensity with which they manifest is an indirect measure of the strength of that tribalism.

Making sense of Sabbateanism is not difficult. Sabbatai Sevi imagined a new way of saving the jews. The jews who more or less agreed with him became the Sabbateans. The jews who preferred the current way of going about it regarded them as heretics. Though the details were different, the thrust of this Sabbatean-flavored “messianism” was neither unique nor uncommon:

As amply demonstrated in studies on Hassidism, another widespread Jewish mystical-messianic movement in Eastern Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, studying the socioeconomic and cultural context of the religious movements provides us a deeper understanding of their developments and their connection to other histories. Ruderman, with the same concern in mind, demonstrates how Jew communities in the early modern period were linked to one another in fascinating ways. To him, especially two early modern figures, Sabbatai Sevi and Marrano-origin Baruch Spinoza, changed Jewish religious and cultural landscapes forever.

Whereas Europeans see Spinoza ambiguously, as a secular figure, jews see him more accurately as a “messiah” figure. As a key proponent of the Enlightenment, Spinoza’s “messianism” had a tremendous impact on Europeans. The “classical liberalism” which sprang from that upheaval is still being actively promoted by “right”-posing jews. It amounts to preaching that it is the height of reason is to renounce tribalism, because as individuals we can better protect “minorities”, like The Tribe. As Ben Tillman once pointedly put it:

So, we have a Jewish intellectual milieu (connected by the Jewish neural network to all other such milieux), out of which comes an intellectual movement of atomisation – the ultimate individualist strategy – the absolute worst strategy we could adopt if we were to face subsequent competition with the Jewish or any other competing group. Might this not be the ultimate in the “culture of critique”? The counterpoint to chapter 5 of Separation and Its Discontents?

Three possibilities come to mind. The first is that the Enlightenment ideals that were the “antithesis” of Judaism were conceptualized by the Jewish community and sold to the gullible goyim. The second is that these ideals were a spontaneous (though ultimately maladaptive) creation of the European intellect reacting to the Jewish presence. The third, which seems most likely, is some combination of the two. Each of these possibilities, however, is dependent on the presence of Jews and/or Jewish memes, the putative “germs”.

The pattern of behavior Kevin MacDonald identified and calls jewish intellectual movements can be better understood as a secularized expression of the jews’ propensity to spawn “mystical-messianic movements”. Indeed, Sisman’s The Burden of Silence is about one form of movement changing into the other. It traces how Sabbateanism, an overtly jewy movement aimed at saving the jews, transmuted into a crypto-jewy movement pursuing the same goal by a different path. The takeaway, for non-jews, is that crypsis, or “silent” jewing, is only the continuation of jewing by other means.

Understanding Kostenki 14 (Markina Gora)

kostenki_14_and_his_doppelganger_nemesis_israel_zangwill

A recent paper announcing the results of the analysis of DNA taken from some ancient bones unearthed in Russia in 1954 is causing a stir. Genomic structure in Europeans dating back at least 36,200 years was published in the journal Science. The abstract reads:

The origin of contemporary Europeans remains contentious. We obtain a genome sequence from Kostenki 14 in European Russia dating to 38,700 to 36,200 years ago, one of the oldest fossils of Anatomically Modern Humans from Europe. We find that K14 shares a close ancestry with the 24,000-year-old Mal’ta boy from central Siberia, European Mesolithic hunter-gatherers, some contemporary western Siberians, and many Europeans, but not eastern Asians. Additionally, the Kostenki 14 genome shows evidence of shared ancestry with a population basal to all Eurasians that also relates to later European Neolithic farmers. We find that Kostenki 14 contains more Neandertal DNA that is contained in longer tracts than present Europeans. Our findings reveal the timing of divergence of western Eurasians and East Asians to be more than 36,200 years ago and that European genomic structure today dates back to the Upper Paleolithic and derives from a meta-population that at times stretched from Europe to central Asia.

The meta-population claim is controversial. More on this below.

ScienceNordic published an article titled, Scandinavians are the earliest Europeans, explaining the results in layman’s terms:

“From a genetic point of view he’s an European,” says Professor Eske Willerslev, Director of the Centre for GeoGenetics at the University of Copenhagen, who was involved in the new study, and adds:

“Actually, he is closer to Danes, Swedes, Finns and Russians than to Frenchmen, Spaniards and Germans”.

Split happened within a 8.000 year gap

The new results reveal that the man is the oldest that we know of so far to genetically represent a separate line from the forebears of present-day Asians. This is decisive when it comes to dating one of the most important events in history.

“We can now date the separation time between Asians and Europeans,” says Professor Rasmus Nielsen from the University of Copenhagen and the University of California, Berkeley, who was also involved in the study.

He points out that the Kostenki genome sets a line 37,000 years ago. Here the lines must have split, while the 45,000-year-old genome from the recently discovered Ust’ Ishim in Siberia sets the limit in the other direction.

This gives the answer to one of the biggest questions in the history of mankind; scientists now know that it is within the 8000 year gap that Europeans and Asians went their separate ways.

Willerslev presents his views in a brief video, Early peopling of Europe.

The ScienceNordic article concludes:

It turns out that Scandinavians are more closely related to the Kostenki man than any other now-living population. This means that Scandinavians are the earliest Europeans.

However, the genome also indicates that many European traits, including those from the Middle East, were already present in the first Europeans.

So from a genetic point of view it makes no sense to categorise the Scandinavians as a separate people.

The article is relatively free of the anti-“racist”/pro-miscegenation spin found in most of the rest of the mainstream, judaized media “reporting” on Kostenki 14 (K14), but that last sentence is patent semitically correct nonsense. The whole premise of the genetic research, and all the various interpretations of it, is that genetic categorization does make sense, because genetic categories are real and significant. This is, for example, why the claim can be made that the K14 genes came from a mixture of three older and distinct genetic categories, that this mix is closest to a contemporary genetic category called Europeans, and furthermore, that it is closer to a genetic subcategory called Scandanavians.

The reality and significance of genetic categorization is a reflection of the biological reality and significance of race. Genetic categorization is race, and vice versa. Those in academia who remain dedicated to understanding genetic reality, and yet wish to avoid being seen as “racist”, simply avoid the term race, even as they examine the very fibers of it. Meanwhile, the rest of academia and all of media, where the hegemonic ideological line is that biological race does not exist, either pretend genetic research and genetic categories don’t exist, or at least twist their reporting on it with nonsense minimizing its significance.

From a genetic point of view it makes sense not only to distinguish Scandanavians from Europeans but to acknowledge even finer subcategories. Moreover, it makes just as much sense to note that all European subcategories – e.g. the Danes, Swedes, Finns, Russians, Frenchmen, Spaniards and Germans mentioned above – have more in common with each other genetically than they have, individually or collectively, with any kind of Asians. The distance is not simply cultural or geographical, but temporal – prior to globalization there was no significant interbreeding between Europeans and Asians for at least 37 thousand years. The distance between Europeans and Africans is greater still, with genetics indicating that the divide dates back at least 100 thousand years.

Those in media or science who are more semitically correct try to obscure these basic facts and instead spin the K14 news to fit the “melting pot”/”nation of immigrants” narrative so favored by the jews. National Geographic’s Europe Was a Melting Pot From the Start, Ancient DNA Reveals is a good example:

Tale of Migrations

Archaeologists and geneticists have long debated who the ancestors of modern Europeans are—and how, and when, they arrived. It’s typically been a tale of migration and invasion, of people moving into Europe in waves that left distinct genetic signatures behind.

First, the thinking goes, there were groups of hunter-gatherers, moving from Africa into Europe beginning about 40,000 years ago. Much later, a separate group of farmers and herders from the Middle East made their way north, eventually out-competing the hunter-gatherer locals and forming the basis for the European genome we see today.

The introduction of agriculture by this second wave of people—the so-called Neolithic Revolution—was such a pivotal moment in prehistory that it can be seen in both artifacts and genes.

The new results add a surprising wrinkle.

What other geneticists have identified as separate hunter-gatherer and farmer genes are all present in the Kostenki find. “You wouldn’t predict if you go back to one of our earliest individuals, all the components of modern Europeans were already there,” Willerslev says. (Related: “Discovery of Oldest DNA Scrambles Human Origins Picture.”)

Genes once thought to have arrived with the first farmers, for instance, now seem to have been around much earlier. “Until now, it seemed clear this was something that came into Europe during the Neolithic,” says Pontus Skoglund, a geneticist at Harvard Medical School. “It’s an extremely interesting suggestion that they have.”

The complex mixture of DNA in such an old specimen, Willerslev says, suggests that Stone Age Europe was a lively place. Instead of separate groups colliding and occasionally mingling, Willerslev argues there was a single, genetically similar population sprawling across the continent, from Russia to the Middle East to northern Europe. (Related: “Blue-Eyed Hunter-Gatherers Roamed Prehistoric Europe, Gene Map Reveals.“)

“Rather than separate populations moving into each others’ areas and having sex with each other,” he says, “there was a single ‘meta-population’ having sex—or exchanging genes—in a complex and heterogeneous way.”

This is a fairly straight telling of the “tale” and what the new K14 analysis might mean, if true. But rather than calling any attention to the relatively long-term similarity of Europeans, or the distinction from Asians and Africans, the article closes by quoting Willerslev projecting the race conscious jew Israel Zangwill’s early 20th century race-mixing-for-the-goyim vision into the prehistoric past:

The new find complicates a picture of Europe’s deep past that geneticists thought was becoming clearer. “We all thought you could sequence these bones and come up with a simple story. This paper really shows things are not as simple as people thought they were,” Willerslev says. “Europe has always been a melting pot.”

Of course, however long and however relatively genetically homogenous Europeans have been, what made them Europeans in the first place was the fact that Europe wasn’t any kind of melting pot for Asians or Africans, as Zangwill’s tribemates (like Barbara Spectre) today envision.

One folkish pro-European response to the National Geographic article came from Steve McNallen at Asatru Update, European Genetics Remarkably Unchanged for at Least 36,000 Years. McNallen accepts the implication that European genetic homogeneity dates back farther than previously believed, yet senses something is wrong. He writes:

Why does the headline tell us one thing, and the body of the article tell us exactly the opposite? Is the idea of a long-term, stable European identity just not permissible under the ruling intellectual paradigm?

Many people recognize the poisonous “ruling intellectual paradigm” without recognizing that the source and driving force is a genetically distinct group which identifies itself as “the jews” and identifies Europeans as the enemy.

Dienekes Pontikos’ Genome of Kostenki-14, an Upper Paleolithic European (Seguin-Orlando, Korneliussen, Sikora, et al. 2014) ignores semitical correctness entirely, but provides more technical information and expresses some skepticism. The most significant point in his opinion:

The new paper shows that K14 was definitely European (or more correctly West Eurasian or Caucasoid), as it was more similar to modern Europeans than to East Asians or other non-West Eurasian populations. Thus, the morphological description of the sample as “Australoid” by some early anthropologists did not reflect its ancestral makeup. Also, this proves that Caucasoids existed 37,000 years ago

Dienekes also describes how this new research meshes with another less controversial result recently published by Lazaridis et al. in Nature, Ancient human genomes suggest three ancestral populations for present-day Europeans:

most present-day Europeans derive from at least three highly differentiated populations: west European hunter-gatherers, who contributed ancestry to all Europeans but not to Near Easterners; ancient north Eurasians related to Upper Palaeolithic Siberians, who contributed to both Europeans and Near Easterners; and early European farmers, who were mainly of Near Eastern origin but also harboured west European hunter-gatherer related ancestry.

In A look at an early European, Peter Frost addresses another smaller and more ancient component:

Modern humans received their Neanderthal admixture when they were just spreading out of Africa some 54,000 years ago.

When our ancestors spread farther north into Europe, some 45,000 to 42,000 years ago, they could have interbred directly with Neanderthals, but they didn’t. Perhaps the two groups were just too different. They seem to have intermixed only via a third party that was neither fully modern nor fully archaic.

Frost’s point – that Europeans who already carried a trace of Neanderthal genes later avoided mixing with them – hasn’t gotten much play in the semitically correct media. Perhaps they think the potential benefit of screeching about ancient “racist” apartheid doesn’t yet outweigh the potential reawakening and reassertion of such instincts. They are eager to pathologize and neutralize aversion to the Other, not call attention to how well-established such instincts are.

Like Dienekes, Frost is relatively sympathetic toward Europeans, and furthermore specializes in the genetics of skin color. Thus his tacit acceptance of the following points carries some weight:

The European phenotype came later

Kostenki Man was dark-skinned, dark-eyed, and rather short. These details, curiously enough, appear not in the paper but in a review of the paper, published by the same journal, as well as in an interview with one of the authors (Associated Press, 2014; Gibbons, 2014).

So we now have an upper bound for the emergence of the European phenotype, i.e., light skin and a diverse palette of hair and eye colors. The lower bound has been set by the remains of a Swedish hunter-gatherer, dated to 8,000 years ago, who had the “European” allele for light skin at the gene SLC24A5 (Skoglund et al., 2014).

Frost’s conclusion:

By retrieving ancient DNA from an early modern human, we have made a key advance in human paleogenetics, perhaps more so than by sequencing the Neanderthal genome. We again see that evolution did not slow down with the emergence of anatomically and behaviorally modern humans some 60,000 years ago. It actually began to speed up, as humans began to enter not only new natural environments but also new cultural environments of their own making.

Greg Cochran rejects the ancient meta-population “melting pot” portion of the K14 results. In Remix Cochran flatly states his belief that Willerslev’s conclusion is wrong. He points out that more recent (8Kya) western European hunter-gatherers didn’t have any ancient north Eurasian genetics, and moreover, there is “plenty of evidence of serious migrations in Europe”. Cochran provides two possible explanations for the result: “a small mixing event” that was not widespread but was instead reproduced again later, or “error: they’ve made a mistake”.

My understanding (laid out here, here and here) is that the genetic makeup of contemporary Whites is a composite of two main components, which I’ve called Old European and Aryan (the semitically correct euphemism is Indo-European). Lazaridis and Cochran use the corresponding terms western European hunter-gatherer (WHG) and early European farmer (EEF). The Neanderthal component was discovered several years ago, but is only a trace. The recent Lazaridis result revealed yet another component in the mix – the so-called ancient north Eurasian (ANE, Cochran also uses “Sibermen”) – which is more significant than Neanderthal, but less than WHG or EEF.

Prior to the K14 analysis the likely hypothesis was that the WHG/EEF mixing occurred when Aryans swept in and combined with the indigenous Old European hunter-gatherers circa 6Kya. Cochran may be right. K14 might be either an anomaly or erroneous. But even if the major genetic amalgamation had already occurred 37Kya, it only means that the Aryans and Old Europeans were more closely related than previously thought.

By the way, the picture Willerslev paints of “one enormous meta-population stretching across Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia” calls to mind the following passage from William Pierce’s Who We Are (emphasis added):

Upper Paleolithic Man

For roughly 20,000 years during the closing chapter of the Ice Ages — the period known to archaeologists as the Upper Paleolithic, or “late old stone age” — our ancestors lived as big-game hunters in Europe, ranging from the Mediterranean coast to the edge of the ice in the north. Their physical remains and those of their artifacts are relatively plentiful, giving us a great deal of information about them and their lifestyle. One of the most striking things about the Upper Paleolithic inhabitants of Europe was their physical homogeneity. Measurements made on their skeletal remains indicate a population more racially homogeneous than that of any European country today — and this population was spread over an enormous area throughout a span of time very long compared to that of all recorded human history.

Whether their relative genetic homogeneity came sooner or later, what should concern Europeans most is that the genocidal “melting pot” that the jews and their useful idiots promote so feverishly today is not only ahistoric and unnatural, but antithetical to very the existence of Europeans.

The Danube Valley Cultures of Old Europe

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The Lost World of Old Europe: The Danube Valley, 5000 3500 BC (links added):

We have embraced a world that I for one didn’t know existed when I was educated many years ago. Nobody ever talked about the fact that there was a great civilization in Europe well before the pyramids, before the ziggurats, before the Mycenaeans, before Periclean Athens, before all of that there was an extraordinary civilization in the Danube river basin.

It also pre-dates the Aryan invasions of Europe.

The evidence of Old Europe is not only in writing, but in other artifacts, and in our DNA. Modern Europeans are essentially an amalgam of haplogroup I Old Europeans and the haplogroup R1 Aryans who later conquered them. The term Old Europe was coined by Marija Gimbutas. I’ve previously discussed the Aryans, Marija Gimbutas and the Old Europeans in Who’s White? – Part 3.

Danube Script from Old Europe 5000 – 3500 BC:

Harald Haarmann is the world’s leading expert on ancient scripts and languages. According to him, these are the oldest writings in the world invented by and ancient civilization that existed in the Balkans thousands of years ago.

This implies that the first high culture in the world originated in the Balkans. So Mesopotamia would no longer be called the Cradle of Civilization. The ancient culture in the Balkans is thousands of years older. The tablets of Tărtăria were found in Romania and they are dated 5500 BC.

Old Europe – The Danube River Valley Civilization 5000 B.C. – 3000 B.C links many images of artifacts from various sources on the web.

Danube Valley cultures:

Danube Valley civilization or the term Old Europe is the name for several advanced cultures in southeastern Europe and surrounding areas who were connected to the Danube River valley. It was a cycle of cultures beginning somewhere between 7,000 – 6,200 BC,[1] its time of peak were 5,500 – 3,500 BC, from 3,500 – 3,000 BC the civilization fell into decline. The main reason for this were perhaps the arrival of the Indo European speaking people from Eastern Europe.

“Indo European speaking people” is a contemporary semitically correct euphemism for Aryan.

The Danube valley civilization is largely a forgotten, rather than lost civilisation.[57] The upheavals that followed the Indo-European infiltrations into Europe from 4300 BC to 2900 BC transformed differents regions at different times. A few areas were left relatively unaffected.

Modern observers have projected quite different visions on the remains of Old Europe. But this much is clear—far earlier than before recognized, southeastern Europe achieved a level of technological skill, artistic creativity, and social sophistication that defies our standard categories and is just beginning to be understood in a systematic way.

Battleground: WWII Anti-“Racist” Propaganda

Battleground (1949), IMDb:

A squad of the 101st Airborne Division copes with being trapped in the besieged city of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge.

The moral of the story – a justification for the war in Europe – is delivered by a preacher. It is a brief scene whose tone and tenor stands conspicuously apart from the rest. In fact the bulk of the film, the action and interpersonal drama, can be seen as a mere delivery mechanism for this poisonous payload:

Was this trip necessary? Well, let’s look at the facts.

Nobody wanted this war but the nazis. A great many people tried to deal with them and alot of em are dead. Millions have died for no other reason except that the nazis wanted em dead. So in the final showdown there was nothing left to do except fight.

There’s a great lesson in this, and those of us who have learned it the hard way aren’t gonna forget it. We must never again let any force dedicated to a super race, or super idea, or super anything become strong enough to impose itself upon a free world. We must be smart enough and tough enough in the beginning, to put out the fire before it starts spreading.

So my answer to the sixty-four dollar question is: yes, this trip was necessary. As the years go by alot of people are gonna forget, but you won’t. And don’t ever let anybody tell you you were a sucker to fight in the war against fascism.

“Let’s look at the facts.” The authoritative voice in The Brotherhood of Man (discussed here) used the same lie to introduce his anti-“racist” fraud.

The fraud here is, “Let’s you and him fight. And don’t ever let anybody tell you you were a sucker, sucker.”

The fact is that the White race – the people of European descent in every country on this planet – lost that war. The jews won.

The film was written by Robert Pirosh:

His most notable success was garnering the Academy Award for his screenplay of Battleground (1949), a motion picture based on the Second World War Battle of the Bulge in which he had himself participated as a Master Sergeant with the 35th Division.

His name is in the list of Jewish Recipients of the Academy Award for Best Original Screenplay.

Charles Lindbergh Speaks on a United European Race

Charles Lindbergh Speaks on a United European Race

Charles Lindbergh, 13 Oct 1939:

Our bond with Europe is a bond of race and not of political ideology. It is the European race we must preserve, political progress will follow. Racial strength is vital, politics a luxury. If the White race is ever seriously threatened, it may then be time for us to take our part in its protection, to fight side by side with the English, French and Germans, but not with one against the other for our mutual destruction.